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Abstract
Detecting covert channels among legitimate traffic rep-
resents a severe challenge due to the high heterogeneity of
networks. Therefore, we propose an effective covert chan-
nel detection method, based on the analysis of DNS network
data passively extracted from a network monitoring system.
The framework is based on a machine learning module and
on the extraction of specific anomaly indicators able to de-
scribe the problem at hand. The contribution of this paper is
two-fold: (i) the machine learning models encompass net-
work profiles tailored to the network users, and not to the
single query events, hence allowing for the creation of be-
havioral profiles and spotting possible deviations from the
normal baseline; (ii) models are created in an unsupervised
mode, thus allowing for the identification of zero-days at-
tacks and avoiding the requirement of signatures or heuris-
tics for new variants. The proposed solution has been eval-
uated over a 15-day-long experimental session with the in-
jection of traffic that covers the most relevant exfiltration
and tunneling attacks: all the malicious variants were de-
tected, while producing a low false-positive rate during the
same period.
1 Introduction
One of the most serious threats to the current society
is represented by cybercrime, with heavy and sometimes
dramatic consequences for many companies, organizations
and single individuals [27, 28, 38, 55, 60]. Data exfil-
tration, in particular, plays a key role in the cybercrime
scenario, as it is related to the stealing of sensitive infor-
mation [26]. Among different techniques of exfiltration,
covert channels represent a significant threat for defenders,
as they are widely used and their detection is challenging.
A covert channel [62] can be defined as a way to commu-
nicate, transfer or exfiltrate data while exploiting network
resources never intended for this purpose. The aim of such
a technique is to extract sensitive information from organi-
zations and companies, while eluding conventional security
measures (e.g., intrusion detection systems and firewalls).
Among the reasons that make covert channels a se-
vere menace for threat hunters, it is worth mentioning the
following: (i) conventional intrusion detection and fire-
wall systems typically fail in the detection of covert chan-
nels; (ii) the network traffic varies considerably, thus caus-
ing detection issues for classical statistical approaches to
covert channel detection; (iii) related to the previous two
points, another issue is the difficulty in distinguishing covert
channels between legitimate communications, this is often
caused by the absence of focus on users behavioral analy-
sis; (iv) although many works focus on the process of tunnel
attacks, only a very restricted number of them analyzes the
properties useful to describe the data exfiltration process.
In this paper, we propose an effective technique for the
detection of DNS covert channels, based on the analysis of
network data passively extracted by a network monitoring
system. The proposed framework is based on a machine
learning module and on the extraction of specific anomaly
indicators able to describe the problem at hand. The fo-
cus of the machine learning module is the creation of mod-
els embedding the behavioral characteristics of a user and
hence spotting possible deviations from the normal base-
line. The power of this approach is the ability to identify
zero-days attacks, without the requirement of signatures or
heuristics for new variants. However, it may carry the draw-
back of highlighting also non-malicious events that are sim-
ilar to covert channels from the perspective of DNS behav-
ior. This could lead to a large number of false positives, but
it is mitigated by a subsequent advanced analytics module,
which encodes cyber security knowledge. This structure al-
lows the proposed framework to identify a dual typology of
attacks: (i) exfiltration, and (ii) tunneling.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
Sect. 2 provides an overview of the related work. In Sect. 3
we briefly describe the monitoring platform containing the
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covert channel detection method, which is the focus of
this paper. After an introduction on the problem, given in
Sect. 4, the proposed approach is described thoroughly in
Sect. 5. Finally, we discuss the experimental results in de-
tails in Sect. 6 and possible future developments in Sect. 7.
2 Related Work
State-of-the-art works regarding covert channels usually
distinguish between two different types: (i) storage covert
channels [13], where covert bits are strictly bounded to
the communication protocols under analysis (e.g., IP, DNS,
HTTP, SMB, SSL); (ii) timing covert channels [52], based
on the manipulation of timing or on the ordering of network
events (e.g., packet arrivals).
Depending on the type of covert channel, associated de-
tection technique may also vary: (i) for the storage covert
channels, typical detection methods involve Markov Chains
and Descriptive Analytics [12]; (ii) for the timing covert
channels, many different approaches have been considered,
in particular: statistical tests of traffic distribution [47], reg-
ularity tests of time variations within the traffic [22], and
machine learning methods [50] such as Support Vector Ma-
chines (SVMs) [3] and Bayesian Networks [2].
The detection framework proposed in this article focuses
on storage covert channel, while borrowing some detection
techniques typically used for the detection of timing covert
channels, e.g., the use of SVMs. For the proposed tech-
nique, DNS covert channels are taken into consideration.
This is motivated by the fact that, at the time of this writing,
DNS represents one of the most common protocol to control
systems and exfiltrate data covertly [11, 17, 43]. Neverthe-
less, DNS covert channel is a method that many organiza-
tions still fail to detect. In its simplest form, this technique
employs the DNS protocol to communicate directly with an
attacker’s external DNS server.
DNS is not designed to exchange an arbitrary amount of
data: therefore, messages are usually short and answers are
not correlated and may not be received in the same order as
the corresponding requests. Usually attackers avoid these
limitations with two approaches: (i) tunneling [39]: the at-
tacker establishes a bidirectional channel to send communi-
cations and instructions from an external server (command
and control, or C&C) to a compromised host; (ii) exfiltra-
tion [44]: the attacker executes data exfiltration from a com-
promised host towards a controlled external server, sending
information with minimal overhead and short and indepen-
dent requests.
Ahmed et al. [1] analyzed data extracted by a network
monitoring system, as several other works in state-of-the-
art [3, 35, 41]. The authors used only stateless attributes of
individual DNS queries, based on three main categories as
characters count (e.g., total count of characters in FQDN,
count of characters in subdomains, count of uppercase and
numerical characters), entropy on strings, and length of dis-
crete labels in the query (e.g., maximum label length and
average label length). The authors developed an anomaly
detection system based on Isolating Forest (iForest). The
approach does not involve any particular DNS record type,
the test phase is deployed solely with the exfiltration tool
DET and the training phase of the model is computationally
very expensive.
Nadler et al. [44] proposed an approach based on the
characteristics of the queries employed for data exchange
over DNS (e.g., longer than the average requests and re-
sponses, with encoded payload and a plethora of unique re-
quests) and on the use of single domains for exfiltration.
As in the previous case, the anomaly detection was based
on iForest. However, this approach considers only A and
AAAA records usage, the tested malware was simulated
with ad-hoc crafted queries in experimental environment;
iodine and dns2tcp were the only tunneling tools taken into
account.
Das et al. [15] underlined that DNS tunneling and mal-
ware exfiltration typically involve an exchange with the at-
tacker server of a part of payload encoded in a subdomain
portion of the DNS query or in the response packet. The
authors proposed two machine learning approaches, (i) a
logistic regression model and (ii) a k-means clustering, re-
spectively (i) for the exfiltration and (ii) for the tunneling
scenarios; these approaches are based on grammatical fea-
tures extracted from queries representative of an encoded
payload (e.g., entropy and number of upper cases, lower
cases, digits, and dashes characters). However, the test
phase lacks several attack scenarios; in particular, for DNS
tunneling, only the tunneling tool dnscat2 with the TXT
record was employed.
Liu et al. [39] analyzed the traffic of several open-source
DNS-tunneling tools based on the extraction of four kinds
of features, including time-interval features (e.g., mean
and variance of time-intervals between a request and a re-
sponse), request packet size, domain entropy, and distinc-
tion of record types (e.g., A, TXT, MX). The authors de-
veloped a binary supervised classification model based on
the description of traffic generated from different DNS-
tunneling tools (e.g., dnscat2, iodine, and dns2tcp). The
solution proposed by [39] consists of an offline component,
where the system trains the classifier, and an online com-
ponent, where the system identifies the tunnel traffic. Nev-
ertheless, during the training phase the DNS traffic is not
collected in a streaming fashion but using a specific dataset.
3 Network Monitoring Platform
The proposed covert channel detection algorithm has
been deployed in a network security monitoring platform
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called aramis (Aizoon Research for Advanced Malware
Identification System) able to automatically identify a wide
range of malware and attacks in near-real-time. This soft-
ware is bundled with dedicated hardware1, and its structure
can be summarized in four phases:
1. Collection: sensors are placed in various nodes of the
network. Each sensor gathers the data from its seg-
ment of the network, pre-analyzes them in real-time
and sends the results to a NoSQL database.
2. Enrichment: inside the NoSQL database, data is en-
riched with information coming from the Cloud Ser-
vice, which collects intelligence from various OSINT
sources and from internally managed sources.
3. Analysis: two kinds of analyses are executed on the
stored data: (i) advanced cybersec analytics to spot
and highlight specific attacks, among which the covert
channel detection module can be found, and (ii) a ma-
chine learning engine which compares the behavior of
each node with the usual one.
4. Visualization: the results are presented through cogni-
tive dashboards, crucial to highlight anomalies.
4 A Glimpse into DNS Covert Channels
In DNS covert channel technique the main challenge is
represented by performing the data exchange in an opti-
mized manner. To accomplish this goal, the structural and
grammatical characteristics of hostname and the capabili-
ties of various DNS record types are exploited [24]. Ac-
cording to the RFC 1034, the hostname can be up to 253
characters long and it is composed by labels each of which
can be up to 63 characters long; each character can be a let-
ter (upper case and lower case are both permitted), a num-
ber or a hyphen. To maximize the data exchanged - the
payload transmitted - in each DNS query, each label of the
subdomain contains a portion of the data, which have previ-
ously been encoded (e.g., using Base32, Base64, Base128
or Hexadecimal codecs) or encrypted (e.g., using RC4 en-
cryption algorithm). Furthermore, depending on the DNS
covert channel scenario, specific DNS record types are em-
ployed. We distinguish between two different cases: (i) ex-
filtration: information might be contained in a subdomain
of a domain and usually the communication is based on
A or AAAA DNS record types; (ii) tunneling: a bidirec-
tional channel between a compromised host and a server
controlled by the attacker is established in order to send
commands and obtain information about the host. The re-
quirement to maintain an open connection determines the
choice of certain DNS records – such as TXT (which is the
1E5-2690 2.9GHz x 2 (2 sockets x 16 cores) 16 x 8GB RAM, 1.1TB
HDD
most common choice), KEY, CNAME, MX, SRV, NULL,
and PRIVATE – that allow transmitting arbitrary portions
of text, in addition to the information exchanged over the
subdomain.
Another crucial point is represented by the information
stored in the stub revolver cache. In fact, normal DNS traffic
is usually reduced by the fact that a huge amount of DNS re-
sponses are cached within the stub resolver; instead, when a
covert channel takes place, the domain-specific traffic tends
to avoid cache by using non-repeating or short time-to-live
messages, resulting in not repeated and unique queries [24].
5 Detection of DNS Covert Channels
The proposed DNS covert channel detection technique is
based on the monitoring of large volumes of DNS requests
from a given IP address and on the analysis of the domain-
related linguistic features [7]. The main idea is to employ
machine learning to create models able to embed the behav-
ioral characteristics of network users’ traffic. An event is
considered anomalous when its results are distant from the
typical behavior modeled by the algorithm. Note that the
analysis relates different queries, and therefore the models
encompass network profiles tailored to the network users,
and not to the single query events. Furthermore, the pos-
sible risk of false positives generation related to the use of
machine learning is mitigated by the analysis of specific de-
scriptors of the DNS tunneling or exfiltration process built
out of the network data.
The general process of the resulting framework is shown
in Figure 1. The raw local recursive DNS server (RDNS)
data are collected, parsed and transformed into logs by the
network monitoring platform described in Sect. 3. Logs
are filtered as described in Sect. 5.1, both in the offline
and in the online component: the first one periodically2 ex-
tracts the features described in Sect. 5.2 from the historical
data collected during the period between two subsequent
runs and builds the related machine learning models. These
models are then used by the online component, which ex-
tracts the related features, detects anomalous queries in real
time, and further analyzes them in order to spot suspicious
queries, which will be the final outputs of the algorithm,
as described in Sect. 5.3. In the following, the three main
phases that compose the algorithm are summarized: (i) fil-
ters: filtering of input RDNS queries extracted by a network
analyzer, (ii) offline phase: assessment of the network under
analysis and creation of models able to describe the normal
behavior of the network, (iii) online phase: validation of
such models to spot potentially anomalous and/or malicious
activities occurring in the network.
2The period was set to six hours as a tradeoff between the need to ana-
lyze enough data to build reliable models and the need to avoid the abuse
of hardware resources.
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Figure 1. Diagram representing the main
steps of the detection algorithm: (i) filters, (ii)
offline phase, and (iii) online phase.
5.1 Filters
The input for both phases is represented by DNS queries
passively extracted by the network analyzer described in
Sect. 3. In order to consider the traffic that may actually
be associated with exfiltration or tunneling, the following
DNS query types are analyzed: TXT, CNAME, MX, SRV,
NULL, KEY, A, AAAA. The collected data are filtered as
described in Table 1: any query or group of queries match-
ing any of the filters is removed from the subsequent analy-
sis.
5.2 Offline Phase
The offline phase takes as input the historical data col-
lected from the network and representing a baseline of the
normal behavior. This phase includes:
1. Feature extraction: raw features are parsed in order to
extract the valuable information useful to describe the
problem at hand.
2. Model creation: a classifier is trained using the ex-
tracted features, with the aim of distinguishing be-
tween patterns performing with a normal behavior and
potentially suspicious patterns.
5.2.1 Feature Extraction
The features used for training the classifier are the follow-
ing.
Table 1. Filters Description
Type Description
White list domains
Domains known to be trusted, e.g., the top 10000
domains in the world provided by Alexa [4] and the
web URLs of the 500 world biggest companies
provided by Forbes [25].
Response code
Only communications which occurred with no error
(associated with response code=0) are kept and the
analysis of retransmissions due to network errors is
avoided.
Content Delivery
Networks
These represent an important source of false
positives for DNS-based detection algorithms [40].
Overloaded DNS DNS queries are often overloaded so to provideanti-spam or anti-malware techniques.
Local and
corporate domains
These domains represent a high percentage of the
legitimate DNS traffic in a corporate network.
IP addresses in the
subdomain
Domains containing an IP address in the subdomains
are typically associated with answers to PTR
requests.
Longest label with
less than 6
characters
We assume that the longest labels used to transfer a
payload necessitate of a minimum number of
characters.
Less than 3
different
hostnames per
domain
After grouping queries with the same domain, we
select domains associated with at least 3 distinct
hostnames, in order to discard the ones which cannot
be involved in an exfiltration process (due to the
minimum number of queries involved in the process).
Duplicated queries Duplicated queries are mainly related withretransmissions, quite common in complex networks.
Uppercase Characters Ratio. Ratio between the number
of uppercase characters and the total number of characters
in the subdomain. A large fraction of uppercase characters
may be associated with a payload encoded in the subdomain
using Base64 encoding, which is widely employed in DNS
covert channels.
Digits Ratio. Ratio between the number of digits and the
total number of characters in the subdomain. A large frac-
tion of digits may indicate a payload encoded or encrypted
into the subdomain.
Total Label Ratio. Total number of characters of the
hostname divided by 253 (maximum number of characters
allowed for a hostname according to RFC 1034). In a wide
variety of DNS covert channel scenarios, a payload is en-
coded or encrypted in the subdomain, aiming at transferring
the maximum possible amount of data to conduct the attack.
As a result, the obtained queries possess a larger number of
characters compared with legitimate queries.
Per Label Ratio. Number of characters of the longest la-
bel of the subdomain divided by 63 (maximum number of
characters allowed for each label in the hostname accord-
ing to RFC 1034). The encoded or encrypted payload might
contain several types of information (e.g., bot-id, campaign-
id, command), in addition to the data exchanged. As a re-
sult, one or more labels, used to exchange data, may contain
a large fraction of the characters in the subdomain, while in
ordinary traffic the lengths of the labels are typically com-
parable, resulting in a moderate length for the longest label.
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5.2.2 Model Creation
A one-class Support Vector Machine (SVM) [51] classifier
with radial basis function kernel has been used to create the
models out of the feature space described in the previous
subsection. In fact, even though the original formulation
of SVMs is related to the resolution of supervised tasks,
the one-class SVM – which has been shown to be an ap-
propriate choice in the context of anomaly detection [54] –
is defined as a boundary-based anomaly detection method,
which modifies the original SVM approach by extending it
in order to deal with unsupervised data. In our context, this
means that the proposed approach is able to train the classi-
fier by using only the normal network traffic, preserving the
malicious samples for the test of the algorithm. In particu-
lar, this implies that the proposed method is more likely to
identify a new variant of a DNS covert channel, as it does
not require a specific training for that variant.
Like traditional SVMs, one-class SVMs can also be
extended to non-linearly transformed spaces using the so
called kernel trick, which amounts to define an appropriate
scalar product in the feature space. In the present work a
radial basis function kernel has been used for the reasons
described in [36], i.e., the scalar product between two fea-
tures vectors ~x and ~x′ has been defined as in Eq. 1
K(~x, ~x′) = exp(−γ||~x− ~x′||2), (1)
where γ is a hyper-parameter which defines the width of the
Gaussian distribution. The objective function maximized by
the algorithm is the so-called soft margin, which is charac-
terized by ν, another hyper-parameter associated with the
penalty related to wrong labelling [51].
The model creation phase (see, for example, [45] for an
introduction on the topic) is repeated every six hours: each
time the collected historical data are randomly split in two
subsets. The first subset (training set) contains 75% of the
data and it is used to train the model over the grid (γ, ν) ∈
{10−3, 10−2, · · · , 102}×{10−3, 10−2, · · · , 102}. The latter
subset (validation set) contains the remaining 25% of the
data and it is used to select the best pair (γ, ν),3 which is
used to recreate the model on the whole data set (training +
validation).
5.3 Online Phase
The online phase analyzes real time data and involves the
following steps:
1. Feature extraction: the same features described in
Sect. 5.2 are extracted.
3Although in principle a different value for the pair (γ, ν) is allowed in
every model creation phase, the validation procedure has selected (γ, ν) =
(0.1, 0.1) for the whole duration of our experiment.
2. Classification: the classifier trained in the offline phase
is applied to online data in order to check whether they
are consistent with the normal behavior; if they do not
conform, the patterns are assessed with the subsequent
module.
3. Advanced analytics: an algorithm combines data min-
ing techniques and cyber security knowledge to per-
form an in-depth analysis of the queries considered
suspicious in the previous step. In the remainder of
the section, we provide a description of this module.
5.3.1 Advanced analytics
The following anomaly indicators of possible covert chan-
nel activity are developed.
Number of unique requests from an IP address to a do-
main. Avoiding the stub resolver cache during an attack
may result in not-repeated requests to a domain. Therefore,
a large number of unique requests from an IP address to a
domain may indicate a DNS covert channel. An indicator ir
is defined as the frequency with which the number of unique
requests from an IP address to a domain falls on the tails of
its distribution (90th percentile).
Number of unique hostnames per domain. Related to the
previous point, also a large number of unique hostnames per
domain might indicate a DNS covert channel. An indicator
ih is defined as the frequency with which the number of
subdomains per domain falls on the tails of its distribution
(90th percentile).
Entropy. The entropy of a subdomain considered as a
sequence of characters is related to its randomness. Since
attackers compress the data to be sent as a payload via en-
coding or encryption, a large entropy may be a sign of an
encoded or encrypted payload. An indicator ie is defined as
the maximum among the entropy of the whole subdomain
and that of its longest label.
Distribution of frequencies of mono-grams and bi-
grams. A distribution of subdomain characters, which is
distant from the distribution of characters of real languages,
may represent another indicator of randomness [48], re-
lated to an encoded or encrypted payload. For each con-
sidered language (English and Italian), ilang,monod (i
lang,bi
d )
is defined as the maximum among the Jaro-Winkler dis-
tance [59] of the mono-grams (bi-grams) distribution of the
subdomain and that of its longest label from the correspond-
ing distribution of the language. Finally, we evaluate the
average id = (i
eng,mono
d + i
eng,bi
d + i
ita,mono
d + i
ita,bi
d )/4.
Anomaly Index. Once the previously described indica-
tors tailored to the DNS protocol are extracted, an anomaly
indexA is built by averaging them: A = (ir+ih+ie+id)/4.
For each machine source, the index is rescaled by taking
into account the fraction between the number ns of suspi-
cious queries and the total number ntot of DNS queries pro-
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Table 2. Malware Description
Name Category APT Codec DNS rtype Domain Detection A
Pisloader Trojan RAT Wekby Base32 TXT local.it-desktop.com 96% 100%
ISMDoor Trojan RAT GreenBug Base64 AAAA basnevs.com 91% 100%
Denis Trojan Backdoor OceanLotus Base64 NULL z.teriava.com 100% 100%
Carbanak Trojan Backdoor Fin7 Custom TXT en.google4-ssl.com 100% 100%
Cobalt Strike Commercial Tool CopyKittens Custom TXT update.cisc0.net 100% 100%
Bondupdater Trojan Powershell OILRig Custom A, TXT withyourface.com 100% 100%
UDPoS PoS Malware - RC4 A ns.service-logmeln.network 100% 100%
DNSpionage Trojan RAT - Base32 A microsoftonedrive.org 100% 100%
duced, according to A → min(1,A + b + c log(ns/ntot)),
where (b, c) = (0.33, 0.067) have been set with a pre-
liminary una tantum validation procedure. The detection
of covert channels has thus been reduced to a very sim-
ple one-dimension classification problem: only queries with
A > Ath are labeled as suspicious, where the optimal
threshold (Ath = 0.25) has been found with the una tan-
tum validation procedure. Note that A may be considered
as an indicator of anomaly from a behavioral point of view.
Table 3. Network Description
15-Days
Total
1-Hour
Average
N. of Machines 360 -
N. of Client Machines 346 -
N. of Connections 43 M 287 k
N. of Resolved DNS Queries 4 M 25 k
N. of Unique Resolved DNS Queries 119 k 791
6 Experimental Evaluation
The proposed DNS covert channel detection algorithm
was evaluated over a real company network: in particular,
the test set comprises 15 days of ordinary traffic – described
in Table 3 – with the injection of traffic which covers the
most relevant exfiltration and tunneling attacks. Note that
the test set has been only used to test the performance of the
algorithm and not to modify the algorithm or the parame-
ters.
Two different experimental designs have been selected
for the test of the algorithm, related with both exfiltration
and tunneling attacks: a malware scenario and a tool sce-
nario, that correspond to two different modes of injection
described in Sect. 6.1 and 6.2 respectively. Both scenarios
have been recreated by injecting the malicious traffic into
the ordinary traffic of a real network, described in Table 3.
6.1 Malware Scenario
The traffic related to malware attacks was injected by
employing 8 pcaps – collected from the public sand-
boxes [31, 33, 49] – associated with 7 different APTs [14,
23, 29, 42, 53, 57, 58] and 1 PoS malware campaign [56].
Table 2 provides a brief description of each malware with
the following information:
• The malware name;
• The category of the malware;
• The name of the APT group related to the malware;
• The codec employed to encode the payload into the
DNS requests;
• The list of DNS record types used by the malware;
• The domain present in each pcap, which is a known
IoC associated to the malware;
• The percentage of detected occurrences, i.e., the num-
ber of detected queries divided by the total number of
queries produced by the malware;
• The value of the anomaly index A, defined in Sect. 5.
6.2 Tool Scenario
The traffic related to attacks performed by tools was in-
jected in the network described in Table 3 by using 5 of the
most popular DNS-tunneling tools [16, 18, 19, 20, 32, 61]
and 1 DNS-file-transfer tool [21]. This choice is motivated
by the state-of-the-art in the exploitation of DNS protocol
for covert channel, assessed by the presence of these tools
inside some Linux distributions for penetration testing, the
supported DNS record types and the state of maintenance of
the tools. Table 4 provides a brief description of each tool
with the following information:
• The name of the tool;
• The list of compatible platforms;
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Table 4. Tools Description
Name Platform Linux PenTest Distro Codec DNS rtype Detection A
dnscat2 Linux, Windows - Hexadecimal
TXT 100% 100%
MX 100% 100%
CNAME 100% 100%
dns2tcp Linux, Windows Kali, BlackArch Base64
TXT 100% 100%
KEY 100% 100%
iodine Linux, Windows,Mac OS X Kali, BlackArch, BackBox Base128
NULL 70.08% 100%
TXT 87.02% 100%
SRV 85.03% 100%
MX 88.11% 100%
CNAME 77.73% 100%
A 86.67% 100%
DNScapy Linux, Mac OS X - Base64
CNAME 13.73% 69%
TXT 12.61% 71%
TXT, CNAME 14.75% 76%
dnsfilexfer
Linux, Windows,
Mac OS X Kali, BlackArch Hexadecimal A 100% 100%
Your-Freedom
Linux, Windows,
Mac OS X - Base64 NULL 100% 100%
• The Linux penetration testing distribution where the
tool is pre-installed;
• The codec employed to encode the payload into the
DNS requests;
• The list of DNS record types supported by the tool;
• The percentage of detected occurrences, i.e., the num-
ber of detected queries divided by the total number of
queries produced by the malware;
• The value of the anomaly index A, defined in Sect. 5.
All the tools considered in this paper require two differ-
ent machines: (i) a host which represents a server hold by
an attacker and (ii) another host which represents either an
unaware infected client or a client controlled by an insider
threat. Both components have been recreated in an appro-
priate way in each experiment (see Table 4).
1. The server component was simulated, whenever possi-
ble, with an appropriate version of a Linux penetration
testing distribution such as Kali Linux [34], BlackArch
Linux [8], and BackBox [6]. In the remaining cases an
ad hoc Linux installation was employed;
2. The client component was simulated with a Windows
or Linux client, with an appropriate version of the op-
erative system (for reasons of compatibility with in-
stalled tools).
All tools employed in the experimental evaluation are
open-source except Your-Freedom. A brief description of
the tools considered follows.
iodine [32] is one of the most popular DNS-tunneling
tools [9, 10, 30, 39, 44] and is pre-installed in all Linux pen-
etration testing distributions considered in this paper. Io-
dine encapsulates an IPv4 packet into the payloads of DNS
packets and needs a TUN/TAP device to operate. It uses
the NULL record type by default, but can support other
record types such as PRIVATE, TXT, SRV, MX, CNAME
and A (returning CNAME). Upstream data is GZIP com-
pressed and encoded; the supported encoding option in-
cludes Base32, Base64, Base64URL and Base128. If
NULL or PRIVATE record types are used, downstream data
is transmitted as GZIP compressed raw IP packet bytes; if
other record types are used, it is GZIP compressed and en-
coded like upstream data.
dnscat2 [20, 39, 48] is designed to create an encrypted
command-and-control (C&C) channel over the DNS pro-
tocol. It uses the TXT, CNAME and MX record types by
default, but it supports also A and AAAA record types if
data are only sent from client to server. All data in both
directions is transported using hexadecimal encoding.
dns2tcp [9, 10, 18, 39] relays TCP connection over DNS,
and is pre-installed in Kali Linux and in BlackArch Linux.
Data encapsulation already takes place at the TCP level,
so no separate driver (TUN/TAP) is required. Dns2tcp re-
quires the list of available resources (e.g., ssh, smpt, pop3)
on server configuration, i.e., the resources that the client can
request to access. It uses the TXT record type by default,
but it can also support the KEY record type. All data in both
directions is transported using Base64 encoding.
DNScapy [10, 19] creates a SSH tunnel through DNS
7
packets. The idea of encapsulating SSH in DNS comes
from OzymanDNS [46]. DNScapy supports CNAME and
TXT record types but the default mode is RAND, which
randomly employs both CNAME and TXT. All data in both
directions is transported using Base64 encoding.
dnsfilexfer [21] exfiltrates files via DNS lookup and is
pre-installed in Kali Linux and in BlackArch Linux. Dns-
filexfer supports only the A record type. All data is trans-
ported using hexadecimal encoding.
Your-Freedom [5, 37, 61] is a tool based on a service
available either in a paid version or in a free version, with
some limitations. Only the client component can be down-
loaded and it requires either OpenVPN or a software that
acts as a socksifier. An appropriate online server, accessible
by the client component, has to be chosen during the setup
of the client. Your-Freedom supports many DNS record
types such as NULL, WKS, TXT, CNAME and MX. All
data in both directions is transported using Base64 encod-
ing.
6.3 Experimental Results
The DNS covert channel detection algorithm described
in Sect. 5 has been evaluated over a 15-day-long experimen-
tal session performed in a test network (described in Table
3) with the injection of traffic related to several malware and
tool attacks. Tables 2 and 4 (described in Sects. 6.1 and 6.2
respectively) clearly show that the proposed method suc-
cessfully detected all the covert channel attacks with high
anomaly and detected occurrence indicators. In particular,
all tools described in Table 4 have been detected with high
detection rate with the exception of DNScapy. In this con-
text, the main difference between DNScapy and the other
variants is the fact that the former produces many state
queries to maintain the established connection alive; these
queries are shorter and are not identified by the algorithm,
which focuses on exfiltration queries. Anyway, it is impor-
tant to note that the proposed method is indeed able to de-
tect a covert channel attack via DNScapy, as the exfiltration
queries are correctly detected. The main purpose of the al-
gorithm is therefore fully reached despite the fact that the
detection rate on the queries is low for this particular tool.
In Table 5 we summarize the performance of the algo-
rithm via the confusion matrix, which contains:
• True Negatives (TN ): The number of unique legitimate
queries that are correctly labeled as legitimate.
• False Negatives (FN ): the number of unique queries
related with malicious covert channels queries that are
incorrectly labeled as legitimate.
• False Positives (FP ): the number of unique legitimate
queries that are incorrectly labeled as covert channels;
many of them are related with particular types of ad-
vertising which produce queries that look very similar
to covert channels4.
• True Positives (TP ): the number of unique queries re-
lated with malicious covert channels that are correctly
detected.
Table 5. Results (Confusion Matrix)
Actual Class
Normal Malicious
Predicted
Class
Normal TN = 116649 FN = 490
Malicious FP = 2033 TP = 18174
A remarkable result is the low rate of false negatives: this
determines indeed a 97% recall, also known as detection
rate, R = TP /(TP + FN ). In particular, false negatives
are mainly due to the evasion of the state queries related to
the DNScapy tool – as previously explained in this Section
– while false positives are mostly related with advertising
queries.
Another metric commonly used to evaluate binary clas-
sifiers is the F-score. It is defined as F = 2P R/(P + R)
(where P = TP /(TP + FP )), and it is a more reliable
indicator for problems in which the classes are highly un-
balanced, as in the present case (the number of legitimate
queries in the test set is much larger than the number of
covert channel related queries). The value obtained in the
experiments is F = 94%. Even though an exact compari-
son is not possible due to the use of different datasets, we
can note that we obtained an F-score almost as large as the
one in the work of [39], despite some crucial differences:
(i) the method proposed in [39] employs a supervised clas-
sifier, i.e., a binary classifier is trained using both legitimate
and malicious queries, while our approach trains the clas-
sifier only with the normal network traffic; this means that
our approach can identity a new variant of a DNS covert
channel without a specific training for that variant; (ii) the
benign parts of the training and test sets in [39] only con-
tain domains in the Alexa top 1-million list [4], while our
corresponding sets contain all the traffic collected from a
real network. We can therefore conclude that the proposed
method brings a relevant contribution in the state-of-the-art
of DNS covert channel detection.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a DNS covert channel detec-
tion method based on the analysis of the DNS traffic of a
4Here are some examples of false positive: (i) ”0w57c49k-
db0dd2cc45455ae425c83e3b8ed8a67a14261606-am1.d.aa.online-
metrix.net”, (ii) ”5b584d886b0f49f795209d5763d8c078.events.ubembed.com”,
(iii) ”y2tyfol9hiuw5hzwe2hnusbzm1qz51545315830.nuid.imrworldwide.com”.
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single network; the analysis requires aramis security moni-
toring system. The proposed framework employs a machine
learning module which provides a behavioral analysis and
specific anomaly indicators able to encompass the charac-
teristics of a covert channel. The main contribution of this
approach is the ability to provide network profiles tailored
to the network users, and not to the single query events,
hence allowing spotting possible deviations from the nor-
mal baseline. Moreover, models are created in an unsuper-
vised mode, thus enabling the identification of zero-days at-
tacks and avoiding the requirement of signatures or heuris-
tics for new variants.
The proposed solution has been evaluated over a test net-
work, with the injection of 8 pcaps associated with 7 differ-
ent APTs and 1 PoS malware campaign and the network
traffic of 5 DNS-tunneling tools and 1 DNS-file-transfer
tool; all the malicious variants were detected, while pro-
ducing a low false-positive rate during the same period.
Another important contribution of the proposed method is
therefore the capability to detect covert channels generated
with a wider variety of malware and tools, compared with
the state-of-the-art.
As a future development, we plan to extend the analy-
sis to other protocols, (e.g., HTTP and HTTPS), and to re-
fine the linguistic anomaly indicators by adding more lan-
guages or custom dictionaries. Moreover, we intend to
broaden the behavioral approach in order to create another
level of profiles tailored to groups of network users sharing
common behavioral characteristics (e.g., same department,
same job).
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